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conducted for [the defendant] even though he now chooses not to
recognize them," 47 the court sustained jurisdiction on the basis that the
defendant had engaged in purposeful activities in New York.
While both a federal district court and the second department
have apparently discarded the distinction between "agents" and "independent contractors" for some jurisdictional purposes, the distinction
may nevertheless have continued vitality in certain situations. For
each of the cases noted dealt with an action by a third party rather than
the case involving a suit brought by an agent against his principal.
Significantly, each court has recognized that different criteria may apply
in the latter instance. 4s Thus, whether or not this capricious distinction
will linger even in that situation is yet to be determined. And harsh
inequities may continue to be wrought until this last vestige of the
agent-independent contractor distinction is discarded for jurisdictional
purposes.
CPLR 302(a)(3): Guidelines established for applicabilityof subsection.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York has refused to interpret CPLR 302(a)(3) in a manner that might
have subjected many local nonresident suppliers to increased litigation
in New York. In Chunky v. Blumenthal Brothers Chocolate Co.,49 a

New York candy manufacturer (Chunky) sued Blumenthal Brothers
Chocolate Co. (hereinafter Blumenthal), a Pennsylvania chocolate
manufacturer, for damages arising from the sale of allegedly contaminated chocolate. Blumenthal, in turn, brought third-party actions
against a Chicago-based milk wholesaler, H.C. Christians Co. (hereinafter Christians), and a Pennsylvania dairy, Grover Farms, Inc. (hereinafter Grover), contending that the milk produced by Grover and sold
by Christians had caused the alleged contamination. It should be
noted that Christians acted only as a middleman for Grover and
Blumenthal; it had neither produced nor delivered any of the milk in
question.
Blumenthal predicated jurisdiction over Grover and Christians
upon CPLR 302(a)(3). The latter two corporations, however, contended that jurisdiction could not be acquired in such manner since
the injury to Blumenthal, if any, had been caused entirely without the
state, i.e., in Pennsylvania. The court quickly disposed of this contention, declaring that the primary action between Chunky and Blum47 82 App. Div. 2d at 425, 302 N.YS.2d at 964.
48 Compare297 F. Supp. at 1152 with 32 App. Div. 2d at 425, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
49299 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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enthal showed injury in New York and that this was the injury which
furnished the basis for the third-party complaint.
Having overcome one of the jurisdictional objections, the court
approached the remaining jurisdictional questions relating to Christians
on the assumption that the corporation had actually committed a tort
in New York in person or through an agent. And, notwithstanding that
assumption, the court held that jurisdiction over Christians under
CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) 50 was lacking because the company derived a mere
four percent of its total revenue from New York sources. In the absence
of a definitive Court of Appeals ruling on the question of "substantial
revenue," the 10 percent criteria suggested by Professor McLaughlin
was followed. 51
The court further held that jurisdiction could not be predicated
upon subsection (a)(3)(ii) of CPLR 302, which requires that the defendant must reasonably expect that its acts will cause injury in New
York 52 and further, that it derive substantial revenue from interstate
or international commerce. The court believed that the statute mandated a construction calling for a greater degree of reasonable foreseeability than that existing in this case in order to protect a defendant's constitutional right to due process. For, in the court's view, how
could Christians have realistically foreseen that the milk it sold to
Blumenthal would eventually become an ingredient to chocolate sold
in New York. 53 Similarly, the court did not believe that the "substantial
revenue from interstate or international commerce" test necessarily met
50 CPLR 302 (a)(3) states that a nondomiciliary will be subject to in personam
jurisdiction in New York when he

commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property

within the state, . . . if he (i) regularly does or solicits business or engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in the state....
(Emphasis added.)
5 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary 121, 125 (1967). The Court of Appeals

has, however, indicated that where a defendant derives less than 2 percent of its total

revenue from the sale of goods in New York it is not "transacting business" in the state.
Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.YS.2d 900 (1966).
52 The Judicial Conference believed CPLR 302 (a)(3) should be:
[B]road enough to protect New York residents yet not so broad as to burden
unfairly non-residents whose connection with the state is so remote and who could
not reasonably be expected to foresee that their acts outside of New York could

have harmful consequences in New York ..

Ihe
statutory requirement of foreseeability relates to forum consequences
generally and not to the specific event which produced injury within the state....

Report to the 1966 Legislature in Relation to the Civil Practice Law and Rules, TwFtH

NEw YoRKt 337, 342, 344
(1967).
53 Blumenthal is a national candy manufacturer. Thus, it is difficult to imagine
that Christians did not actually foresee the forum consequences of its sale.
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the Supreme Court's requirement of minimum contacts 4 with the state
of the forum. Judge Mansfield opined that
[t]he standards set forth by the Supreme Court contemplate a more
substantial contact with the forum state itself as opposed to a
general engagement in interstate commerce. 55
As to Grover, the sole jurisdictional issue was whether CPLR
302(a)(3)(ii) was constitutionally applicable. The court answered this
question in the negative because Blumenthal failed to prove that
Grover regularly introduced goods into interstate commerce. Furthermore, the jurisdictional reasoning applicable to Christians could be
applied even more so to Grover because the latter had even fewer
contacts with New York:
If Grover could be brought into this action, then any supplier of
raw material to a manufacturer which engages in interstate commerce could be compelled to defend an action in foreign jurisdictions with which the supplier has never had any contact. 56
The court's discussion of due process and substantial revenue is a
welcome addition to the mounting case law on our long-arm statute.
Moreover, the Chunky rationale presents a realistic approach which
curbs, at least temporarily, some of the inequities that could arise from
any overly liberal application of CPLR 302(a)(3).
CPLR 302(a)(3): Jurisdiction obtained in conversion action.
The scope of CPLR 302(a)(3) has, in the past, been limited to

negligence and product liability cases. However, in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Richardson,57 the section was extended to encompass conversion actions as well.
Defendant Richardson, a New York domiciliary, was.a conditional
vendee of an automobile in which the plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corp. (hereinafter GMAC), had a secured interest. Richardson
delivered the automobile to the second defendant, Manheim Auto

Auction, Inc. (hereinafter Manheim) for the purpose of effecting a
sale. Manheim's principal place of business was in Pennsylvania.
GMAC sued both defendants for conversion in New York, claiming that jurisdiction existed over Manheim by virtue of CPLR 302
(a)(1) and (3). The latter's operations as an auto auctioneer consisted
54 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

55 299 F. Supp. at 116.
56Id. at 117.
57 59 Misc. 2d 744, 300 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969).

